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ABSTRACT
This paper introduces the strategic approach to regulating personal
data and the normative foundations of the European Union’s
General Data Protection Regulation (‘GDPR’). We explain the
genesis of the GDPR, which is best understood as an extension
and refinement of existing requirements imposed by the 1995
Data Protection Directive; describe the GDPR’s approach and
provisions; and make predictions about the GDPR’s implications.
We also highlight where the GDPR takes a different approach
than U.S. privacy law. The GDPR is the most consequential
regulatory development in information policy in a generation. The
GDPR brings personal data into a detailed regulatory regime, that
will influence personal data usage worldwide. Understood
properly, the GDPR encourages firms to develop information
governance frameworks, to in-house data use, and to keep
humans in the loop in decision making. Companies with direct
relationships with consumers have strategic advantages under the
GDPR, compared to third party advertising firms on the internet.
To reach these objectives, the GDPR uses big sticks, structural
elements that make proving violations easier, but only a few
carrots. The GDPR will complicate and restrain some information-
intensive business models. But the GDPR will also enable
approaches previously impossible under less-protective
approaches.
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1. Introduction
‘Personal data is the new oil of the internet and the new currency of the digital world.’1
Suppose one bought into the metaphor of data as the new oil. One would want this
new oil handled carefully. From extraction to disposal, all of its treatments would be
planned carefully and executed by trained experts. One would want its extraction
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1M Kuneva, ‘Keynote Speech SPEECH/09/156’ (Roundtable on Online Data Collection, Targeting and Profiling March 31,
2009) <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-09-156_en.htm>. All URLs in the footnotes were last accessed
on 16 January 2019.
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governed by a permit process, its uses managed to ensure it was not wasted, its storage
secure, its disposal environmentally sound. One would want its externalities internalized
and stakeholder interests considered.
The European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (‘GDPR’)2 faithfully executes
the implications of the oil metaphor, despite the metaphor’s poor fit. The GDPR presumes
that personal data are important, so much so that every aspect of interacting with data
requires careful planning.
In this paper, we explain the GDPR approach to lawyers and academics, whether they
are privacy and EU law specialists or not. We explain the GDPR’s normative roots in mul-
tiple constitutional documents, detail its most important provisions, and tie these pro-
visions to the short and medium-term strategic goals of the GDPR. We also highlight
differences and similarities when comparing the GDPR to U.S. privacy law.
The GDPR has been law since 2016, but did not enter most lawyers’ attention until 2018,
when its provisions became enforceable.3 In fact, much of the GDPR’s requirements were
reflected in an earlier law – the Data Protection Directive – which had poor enforcement
and compliance. The GDPR awakened lawyers and the business community because it
calls for minimum 8-figure fines and creates both internal and external mechanisms to
bolster enforcement efforts.
As a result, the GDPR is the most consequential regulatory development in information
policy in a generation. The GDPR brings personal data into a complex and protective regu-
latory regime. That said, the ideas contained within the GDPR are not entirely European, nor
new. The GDPR’s protections can be found – albeit in weaker, less prescriptive forms – in U.S.
privacy laws and in Federal Trade Commission settlements with companies.4
To get to the GDPR, some level-setting is in order. First, one should not underestimate
the commitment to data protection in Europe. The GDPR implements constitutional com-
mitments, ones that are deep and occupy a central place in the self-conception of a new,
information age political body. As one of the drafters of the Charter of Fundamental Rights
of the European Union, Stefano Rodotà, explained,
The fundamental right to personal data protection should be considered a promise just like
the one made by the king to his knights in 1215, in the Magna Charta, that they would not
be imprisoned or tortured illegally – ‘nor will go upon him nor send upon him.’ This
promise, the habeas corpus, should be renewed and shifted from the physical body to the
electronic body. The inviolability of the person must be reconfirmed and reinforced in the
electronic dimension, according to the new attention paid to the respect for the human
body (…).5
These commitments germinated long before the rise of contemporary Silicon Valley data
companies but have only intensified as such companies have gained dominance.
2Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural
persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive
95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), OJ 2016 L 119/1 <http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/reform/
files/regulation_oj_en.pdf> (hereafter, ‘GDPR’).
3GDPR art 99(2): ‘It shall apply from 25 May 2018.’
4U.S. credit reporting laws have use limitations; communications laws regulate collection, use and sale of user data; the
videotape privacy protection act establishes deletion requirements; credit reporting and cable and satellite providers
must provide data subject access; and so on.
5S Rodotà, ‘Data Protection as Fundamental Human Right,’ in S Gutwirth, Y Poullet, P De Hert, C de Terwangne, and S
Nouwt (eds), Reinventing Data Protection? (Springer, 2009).
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To make the electronic body inviolable, the GDPR covers an immense landscape of
potential informational problems. The GDPR attempts to answer information questions
ex ante. Even remote, edge-case hypotheticals about data can be answered in the
GDPR framework, with varying degrees of satisfaction.
Second, laws such as the EU’s GDPR differ in construction from most U.S. regulatory
text. The GDPR’s text is vague in some places and speaks at the level of aspirational prin-
ciple. Parts of the GDPR could be characterized as ‘principles-based regulation’.6 The
GDPR’s provisions are supplemented with even more indeterminate ‘recitals.’7 Such text
flummoxes U.S. lawyers because of its lack of specificity.
Third, the difference in construction leads to a practical consequence: whereas in the
U.S., interactions with regulators typically mean that enforcement is afoot, in the E.U.
context, colloquy with regulators is a routine rite in the compliance process. U.S.
lawyers have fretted about perfect compliance, but in reality, European regulators rarely
expect such compliance, nor will they impose 8-figure liability for small imperfections.
As we explain below, massive liability will also be keyed to serious wrongdoing rather
than accident or simple noncompliance.
This paper does not aim to give detailed analyses of each GDPR provision. Rather, we
focus on big themes, and often provide rough summaries of provisions, leaving out details
that could be important in legal practice. Lawyers who apply the GDPR must, of course,
consult the GDPR itself, and related guidance documents and case law.8
1.1. The GDPR’s strategic implications
Throughout these sections, we discuss the strategic implications of the GDPR. We intro-
duce eight key implications briefly here. First, the GDPR can be seen as a data governance
framework. The GDPR encourages companies to think carefully about data and have a plan
for the collection, use, and destruction of the data. The GDPR compliance process may
cause some businesses to increase the use of data in their activities, especially if the com-
panies are not data-intensive, but the GDPR causes them to realize the utility of data. Other
businesses will use GDPR as an opportunity to more accurately evaluate the value of their
data, converting the data to a strategic asset, on the same level as companies view their
patent portfolio or copyrights.
Second, the GDPR attempts to put privacy on par with the laws that companies take
seriously – antitrust and foreign corrupt practices law. Prior to the GDPR, large data com-
panies faced low fines, often less than these companies pay a single entry-level engineer in
6See R Baldwin, M Cave, and M Lodge, Understanding Regulation: Theory, Strategy, and Practice (2nd edn, Oxford University
Press, Cambridge, 2011) 303; FJ Zuiderveen Borgesius, Improving privacy Protection in the Area of Behavioural Targeting
(Kluwer Law International, 2015) 259–63.
7The Court of Justice of the European Union sometimes refer to recitals in data protection cases. See, e.g. Case C-131/12
Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD), Mario Costeja González [2014] ECLI:EU:
C:2014:317.]; See generally on the role of recitals T Klimas and J Vaičiukaitė, ‘The Law of Recitals in European Community
Legislation’ (2008) 15 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law 3.
8A few commentaries on the GDPR have been published in English, such as D Rücker and T Kugler, New European General
Data Protection Regulation (C.H. Beck Hart Nomos, 2018); P Voigt and A Von dem Bussche, The EU General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR) (Springer, 2017); European Agency for Fundamental Rights, ‘Handbook on European Data Protection
Law’ (2018 edition) (Publications Office of the European Union, 2018). Several other teams are busy on article-by-article
commentaries, including Christopher Kuner, Lee A. Bygrave, and Christopher Docksey (Oxford University Press, 2019) and
Franziska Boehme and Mark Cole (2019).
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a year.9 The GDPR’s enforcement mechanisms, penalty determination, expanded security
incident notification, and procedural requirements that have the effect of documenting
deviations from the law, will deter executives from seeing privacy violations as parking
tickets. In addition, the GDPR’s expanded view of what constitutes a ‘breach’ means
that companies will file many more notices of security incidents.10 Since the adoption
of the GDPR, privacy and personal data are being discussed at the highest levels in com-
panies. Many companies have revised their data practices, and take, for the first time, a
professional approach to handling personal data.
Third, the GDPR requires protections to follow data. Companies that use personal data
must vet service providers and impose contractual limits on data use. As a result, the GDPR
has diffused far beyond first parties, to the many third parties involved in some kind of
data services. Any large multinational requires GDPR compliance, thus, a fantastic
number of service providers to such companies must make contractual commitments
on data use, security, breach notification, and data retention. These service providers
see requirements to comply with the GDPR as a form of economic coercion coming
from their business associates rather than government coercion.
Fourth, the GDPR structurally elevates privacy officials within companies, giving them a
tenure-like right but also responsibilities that transcend loyalty to the firm. The role of the
Data Protection Officer, described in more detail below, will grease the wheels of enforce-
ment, because these employees will be tasked with documenting what actually happens
with data. Data depredations will be more difficult to hide. In enforcement proceedings,
the accounting that companies have to undertake will provide the proof of non-
compliance.
Fifth, the GDPR is constitutionally skeptical of U.S. lawyers’ favorite tool: consent, particu-
larly of the low-quality or ‘take it or leave it’ variety.11 The GDPR’s architects realized that if
low-voluntariness consent could justify data activities, the GDPR would just become
another exercise in clicking ‘I agree’ to unread, unnegotiable terms. The GDPR requires
high-quality consent, on par with important life decisions, such as consent to medical treat-
ment. Inmany contexts, the burdens the GDPR places on consentmake consent impossible
as mechanism tomake data uses legal. Moreover, many rules in the GDPR are not waivable,
and continue to apply after somebody has consented to data use.12
Sixth, as governments and technology companies dream of removing humans from
decision-making processes, the GDPR makes a clear policy preference for human-in-the-
loop systems. This happens as big data advocates have waived off concerns about erro-
neous data, arguing that large enough datasets make analysis possible with low-accuracy
data. The GDPR tacks the other direction. GDPR’s individual correction and remediation
rights double down on the idea that personal data are important and should be accurate.
Seventh, the GDPR favors first-party relationships between data subjects and compa-
nies. Third party advertising and content networks have been the big winners online,
9For instance, the CNIL levied its maximum fine against Facebook in 2017 for tracking users for advertising purposes. The
fine was 150,000. See section 7 on enforcement.
10Reports of data breaches to the UK’s Information Commissioner’s Office have quadrupled in the months that the GDPR
became enforceable. M Schwartz, ‘Under GDPR, Data Breach Reports in UK Have Quadrupled,’ Bank Info Security (25 July
2018) <https://www.bankinfosecurity.com/under-gdpr-data-breach-reports-in-uk-have-quadrupled-a-11249?>
11C Hoofnagle, ‘Designing for Consent’ (2018) 7(2) Journal of European Consumer and Market Law 162. See in more detail
on consent: Section 4.2 of this paper.
12For instance, the fair information principles from article 5 continue to apply after consent. See Section 4.1.
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but the GDPR recognizes the pathologies and misalignment flowing from third party data
relationships. For instance, third party marketing companies exercise a ‘tech tax’ on pub-
lishers, leaving themwith just $0.40 on each dollar spent on online advertising.13 While the
GDPR burdens third party data uses, it sees many controller uses of data as ‘legitimate.’14
First-party-favorable incentive structures could reshape internet commerce. For instance,
data ‘infomediaries,’ companies that broker personal information on behalf of a data
subject,15 could become a practicable business model under the GDPR. Under less restric-
tive regimes, companies find it cheaper to buy personal data from third parties rather than
the data subject.
Eighth, there will be a period of experimentation, opportunism and mistake. When the
GDPR became enforceable in May 2018, services barraged users with inane, widely-criti-
cized privacy policies. Practitioners know that the real activity was ‘under the hood’ and
substantial. The GDPR required extensive auditing of data collection and use; in the
process, companies had to have a hard look at existing practices and the reliability of
vendors. Many consent requests by companies were probably not in compliance with
the GDPR. Companies ‘in the sights’ of the GDPR are likely to anchor with superficially
acceptable practices, in the knowledge that enforcers will target them whether or not
they fully embrace the law. We foresee an extended tussle between authorities and
large companies such as Google and Facebook that involves positioning, anchoring,
and other gamesmanship intended to blunt the GDPR’s effects.
1.2. Roadmap
The GDPR’s normative roots are deep. Section 2 below provides the historical background
and political context of European data protection law and the GDPR. We recount the high-
level commitments to privacy in its various forms, and how the EU’s 1995 Data Protection
Directive (‘Directive’) set the stage for the GDPR. In fact, companies in compliance with the
Directive will find an evolution in privacy protections rather than a revolution. Yet few
companies complied because of the relatively paltry fines in the Directive – fines that
the GDPR greatly strengthens.
Sections 3–7 discuss the GDPR’s contours, highlighting the issues of most concern to
businesses. These include the GDPR’s fines and enforcement mechanism, its presumption
that data activities are illegal unless they have some sound basis, the broad definitions, its
extraterritoriality, and the rights of data subjects. The GDPR covers a huge landscape of
data activities; no U.S. information law is as broad and ambitious.
2. Background to the GDPR
Europe has long recognized privacy explicitly as a human right.16 Europeans’ commit-
ments go beyond the home, the focus of so much U.S. law, to include protections for
13R Benes, ‘Why Tech Firms Obtain Most of the Money in Programmatic Ad Buys’ eMarketerPro (16 April 2018) (reporting on
J Mcdonald, ‘Global Ad Trends, March 2018: Threats to digital advertising,’ Warc, (March 2018)).
14See Section 4.2, and GDPR art 6(1)(f).
15Bethany L. Leickly, ‘Intermediaries in Information Economies’ (PhD dissertation, Georgetown University, 2004).
16In this paper, we use the phrases ‘human right’ and ‘fundamental right’ interchangeably. See on the difference: G Gon-
zalez Fuster, The Emergence of Personal Data Protection as a Fundamental Right (Springer, 2014) 164–6.
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family life, communications, reputation,17 and with the rise of the information age, for
privacy in the context of data processing.
While U.S. lawyers may refer broadly to ‘privacy’ or to ‘information privacy’, European
law discusses information privacy as ‘data protection.’18 In Europe, data protection is
increasingly seen as separate from the right to privacy. Data protection focuses on
whether data is used fairly and with due process19 while privacy preserves the Athenian
ideal of private life.20
The 1970s was a key point of privacy divergence between the U.S. and Europe. The U.S.
articulated Fair Information Practices (‘FIPs’),21 the building blocks of all information privacy
laws, but applied them in a serious sense only to the government in the form of the Privacy
Act of 1974,22 and to the private sector only in the credit reporting sector.23 Europe
embraced the FIPs, deepened and expanded them, and applied them to all information
processing – both ‘vertically,’ that is government to citizen, and ‘horizontally,’ that is,
business to citizen. The U.S. followed a sectoral model, leaving many forms of information
practices regulated only by the Federal Trade Commission’s general consumer protection
authority.
By 1990, the European Commission feared that diverging national data protection
laws would hinder the internal market in the EU.24 That year, it published a proposal
for a Data Protection Directive. After five years of negotiations, the final Data Protec-
tion Directive was adopted in 1995.25 The Directive laid down an omnibus regime
based on the FIPs, which applied to most of the private and public sector (with
17Article 8 of the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights provides protection to private and family life, home, and
communication. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Article 8, 4 November 1950,
213 U.N.T.S. 222. Most national constitutions in Europe also protect privacy and related rights. See on constitutional pro-
tection of privacy in European countries: BJ Koops, B Newell, T Timan, I Škorvánek, T Chokrevski, M Galič, ‘A Typology of
Privacy,’ (2017) 38(2) University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law 483.
18Information privacy ‘concerns the collection, use and disclosure of personal information’, PM Schwartz and DJ Solove,
Information Privacy (Aspen, 2009) 1. Data privacy and information privacy refer to roughly the same concept.
19G Gonzalez Fuster, The Emergence of Personal Data Protection as a Fundamental Right (Springer, 2014).
20Consider the distinction made in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union: ‘Article 7 – Respect for private
and family life: Everyone has the right to respect for his or her private and family life, home and communications.’
Article 8 – Protection of personal data: Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning him
or her. 2. Such data must be processed fairly for specified purposes and on the basis of the consent of the person
concerned or some other legitimate basis laid down by law. Everyone has the right of access to data which has
been collected concerning him or her, and the right to have it rectified. 3. Compliance with these rules shall be
subject to control by an independent authority.
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (OJ C 364 of 18 December 2000) (hereafter, the ‘Charter’) <http://
www.europarl.europa.eu/charter/pdf/text_en.pdf>. The Charter was adopted in 2000, and was made a legally binding
instrument by the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009. Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty
establishing the European Community [2007] OJ C306/01.
21See Robert Gellman, ‘Fair Information Practices: A Basic History’ (April 2017) <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2415020>; CJ Hoofnagle, ‘The Origin of Fair Information Practices: Archive of the Meetings of the Secretary’s
Advisory Committee on Automated Personal Data Systems (SACAPDS)’ (July 2014) <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=2466418>; CJ Bennett, Regulating Privacy: Data Protection and Public Policy in Europe and the United
States (Cornell University Press, 1992).
22Privacy Act of 1974 5 U.S.C. 552a (2017).
23Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970 15 USC 1681 et seq (2017).
24The European Commission proposes and enforces legislation and implements policies and the EU budget. It can be seen
as the EU executive power. See European Commission, ‘The European Commission’s Priorities’ <https://ec.europa.eu/
commission/index_en>.
25On the history of the Directive see: A Newman, Protectors of Privacy: Regulating Personal Data in the Global Economy
(Cornell University Press, 2008).
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exceptions to the latter).26 The Directive required member states to enact implement-
ing legislation.27
Problems quickly emerged with the Directive. The Directive did not fully harmonize
national privacy laws, and even within Europe, countries behaved opportunistically to
court big tech with signals of weak enforcement and advantageous tax schemes. (Some
speak of data protection law’s ‘loophole’ in Ireland.28) Even among countries committed
to privacy, enforcement was limp wristed, with the French fining Facebook a mere
150,000 Euros in 2017.29 This enforcement gap left Europe with a reputation of a region
with rules but no real policing while the U.S. was seen as not being rule bound yet it
had the Federal Trade Commission on the enforcement beat.30
The GDPR is the EU’s attempt to address these and other shortfalls. It did so in a process
completely unlike U.S. legislative efforts. European policy makers started a process that
involved a multitude of expert consultation and deep sophistication about how infor-
mation practices can be manipulated to evade regulatory goals.
Consultation began in 200931 and the European Commission published a proposal text
in 2012.32 Two years later, the European Parliament adopted a compromise text, based on
almost 4,000 proposed amendments.33 The Council of the European Union published its
proposal for the GDPR in 2015, to start negotiations with the European Parliament.34 In
December 2015, the Parliament and Council reached agreement on the text of the
GDPR. The GDPR was officially adopted in May 2016, and applies since May 2018.35
Now that the GDPR is enforceable, its interpretation is entrusted to the courts, com-
bined with persuasive, albeit non-binding, interpretation by the newly created European
Data Protection Board. The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) is the highest
authority on the interpretation of EU law.36 The CJEU has delivered a number of dramatic,
26Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals
with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (hereafter the ‘Directive’). Some
parts of the public sector are outside the scope of the Directive (see Article 3(2) and Article 13). Some data processing
practices in the private sector are partially exempted; processing for purely personal purposes (Article 3(2)), and for jour-
nalistic purposes (Article 9).
27Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [2012] OJ C326/47 (TFEU) art 288 <http://
eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:12012E/TXT&from=EN>.
28J Albrecht, ‘#EUdataP State of the Union,’ (speech at the Chaos Communication Congress, 2013) <http://www.janalbrecht.
eu/fileadmin/material/Dokumente/30C3-JPA-EUdataP.pdf>.
29CNIL, ‘Facebook Sanctioned for Several Breaches of the French Data Protection Act,’ May 16, 2017 <https://www.cnil.fr/
en/facebook-sanctioned-several-breaches-french-data-protection-act>. See also Section 7 on enforcement.
30Kenneth Bamberger and Deirdre K Mulligan, Privacy on the Ground (MIT Press, 2015).
31European Commission, ‘Commission StaffWorking Paper, Impact Assessment Accompanying the document Regulation of
the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal
data and on the free movement of such data (General Data Protection Regulation) and Directive of the European Parlia-
ment and of the Council on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data by competent
authorities for the purposes of prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of
criminal penalties, and the free movement of such data’ (25 January 2012) 8.
32The European Commission is the EU’s executive arm. See European Commission, ‘The European Commission’s priorities’
(website) <https://ec.europa.eu/commission/index_en>.
33LIBE Compromise, proposal for a Data Protection Regulation (this paper refers to the unofficial Consolidated Version after
LIBE Committee Vote, provided by the Rapporteur, General Data Protection Regulation, 22 October 2013. The European
Parliament is an EU body with legislative, supervisory, and budgetary responsibilities. It is directly elected. <http://www.
europarl.europa.eu/portal/>
34The Council of the European Union consists of government ministers from each EU country, according to the policy area
to be discussed. European Council, ‘Council of the European Union’ <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/home/>.
35GDPR art 99(2): ‘It shall apply from 25 May 2018.’
36National judges in the EU can, and in some cases must, ask the Court of Justice of the European Union if they are unsure
how to interpret EU rules. For instance, if a national judge does not know how to interpret a national provision that is
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pro-privacy decisions, including striking down the data retention mandates,37 striking
down the US–EU Safe Harbor agreement,38 and granting people, under certain conditions,
a ‘right to be forgotten.’39 Thus information industries face a more hostile judicial environ-
ment than in the U.S.
Like the Directive from 1995, the GDPR’s first article stresses that the GDPR has a dual
goal of promoting the free flow of personal data within the EU (to help businesses), and
protecting people and their personal data.40 Yet, the GDPR emphasizes the latter goal. The
GDPR sets normative preferences in tension with information-intensive industry practices,
particularly those performed by third parties. The GDPR lies in great tension with big data
and machine learning business models, at least in their current form.
3. When does the GDPR apply?
3.1. Personal data and processing
The GDPR’s architects studied information industry practices and even academic literature
on cutting-edge identification techniques. For this and other reasons, the GDPR has extra-
ordinarily broad scope in every dimension. Two threshold definitions are ‘personal data,’
and the information activities considered ‘processing.’
All privacy laws define covered data. The GDPR sets a low bar, defining ‘personal data’
as ‘any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (“data subject”);
an identifiable natural person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly (…)’.41
Thus, the GDPR’s concept of personal data is much broader than personally identifiable
information such as names or addresses. In brief, every datum that identifies a person
or could identify a person in the future is personal data. Public and non-sensitive infor-
mation can also fall within the scope of ‘personal data,’ as do pseudonymous identifiers,42
IP addresses, tracking cookies, and similar data. The GDPR also added ‘location data’ and
‘online identifiers’ as examples of identifiers in the GDPR’s personal data definition.43
The GDPR applies when ‘personal data’ are ‘processed’. The GDPR defines ‘processing’
as ‘any operation or set of operations which is performed on personal data or on sets of
personal data, whether or not by automated means (…)’.44 This includes activities such
as collecting, storing, disclosing, and erasing data. Consequently, practically everything
that can be done with personal data will be considered to be ‘processing’.
Taken together, these key definitions mean that, in principle, an organization processes
‘personal data’ within the meaning of the GDPR, whenever that organization touches data
based on an EU directive, the national judge must ask advice from the Court of Justice of the European Union (Article 19
(3)(b) of the Treaty on European Union, consolidated version).
37Joined Cases C-293/12 and C-594/12 Digital Rights Ireland Ltd v Minister for Communications, Marine and Natural Resources
and Others and Kärntner Landesregierung and Others [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:238.
38Case C-362/14 Maximillian Schrems v Data Protection Comr., [2015] ECLI:EU:C:2015:650.
39Case C-131/12 Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD), Mario Costeja González
[2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:317.
40GDPR art (1). The GDPR ‘lays down rules relating to the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of
personal data and rules relating to the free movement of personal data.’
41GDPR art 4(1).
42GDPR rec 26.
43The EU also adopted rules to safeguard the free flow of non-personal data: Regulation (EU) 2018/1807 of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 14 November 2018 on a framework for the free flow of non-personal data in the Euro-
pean Union.
44GDPR art 4(2). GDPR recommends pseudonymization as a security measure. GDPR art 4(5). See also rec 28 and 29.
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that relate to an individual, whether the data are public or private, sensitive or non-sensi-
tive, directly or indirectly identify a person, and whether identification is possible now or in
the future.
3.2. Who is accountable for upholding the GDPR requirements?
The four most important actors in the GDPR are ‘data subjects’, ‘controllers’, ‘processors’,
and ‘Data Protection Authorities’.45 ‘Data subjects’ are people – the natural persons whose
personal data are processed.46 ‘Controllers’ are those who determine the purposes and the
means of processing of personal data – companies for example.47 ‘Processors’ are entities
that do something with personal data on behalf of controllers;48 in such case, there is a
clear hierarchy. For example, if company Y gathers and analyzes survey data on the cus-
tomers of company X, as instructed by company X, company X is the controller and
company Y the data processor. If two organizations work together in determining why
and how personal data will be processed, they will be seen as joint controllers and will
share the regulatory burden and liability for errors and mistakes.
In the U.S. system, much is left to data subjects. They are supposed to read and critically
evaluate privacy notices, and make choices in the marketplace based on this careful
study.49 Europeans reject that approach and place the clear burden of responsibility on
controllers. Data processors, such as a data center or cloud provider, have to comply
with a considerable proportion of the GDPR. If data processors violate the GDPR, in prin-
ciple, the data controller will be considered responsible and liable.
The GDPR attempts to head off predictable principal-agent problems with processors. It
requires that controllers ensure that processors are competent and responsible. To estab-
lish a chain of accountability, processors cannot subcontract without consent of the con-
troller. The GDPR also specifies that if the subcontracted processor fails to fulfill its data
protection obligations, the initial processor shall remain fully liable to the controller for
the performance of that other processor’s obligations.50
3.3. The GDPR’s extraterritoriality
Personal data present several regulatory puzzles. For example, if companies can simply
move information out of Europe to ‘data havens’ where no rules apply, the European
privacy enterprise will fail. Thus, like the Directive did,51 the GDPR imposes controls on per-
sonal data outside the EU. Another problem is that a small company with little revenue and
few employees can still possess sensitive data on almost everyone in the world. Thus, the
GDPR eschews traditional employee and revenue size thresholds for limiting coverage of
the law.
45Apart from data controllers and data processors, there are several other positions, such as the recipient (GDPR art 4(9)),
the third party (GDPR art 4(10)) and the representative (GDPR art 4(17)), but these positions fall outside the scope of this
paper.
46GDPR art 4(1).
47GDPR art 4(7).
48GDPR art 4(8).
49D Solove, ‘Privacy Self-Management and the Consent Dilemma’ (2013) 126 Harvard Law Review 1879.
50See also GDPR art 29.
51See for the situation under the Directive, among others: C-191/15 Verein für Konsumenteninformation v Amazon EU Sàrl
[2016] ECLI:EU:C:2016:612.
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Obviously, a company that has offices or personnel in Europe will be subject to the
GDPR.52 For instance, the CJEU held that Google Spain is an establishment of Google
Inc., and that some of the advertising activities aimed at the Spanish public were
‘carried out in the context of the activities’ of the Spanish establishment, so Google Inc.
had to comply with EU law.53
But even if a company has no physical presence in Europe, the GDPR can apply.54 For
instance, offering goods or services, even free ones,55 to Europeans can trigger the GDPR if
it is ‘apparent that the controller or processor envisages offering services to data subjects
in one or more Member States in the Union.’56 Simply making a website available is not
enough, but using local language or currency may make it apparent that one is offering
services to Europeans.57 The basic philosophy of the GDPR is that when non-EU based
organizations consciously process personal data of people in the EU, the GDPR will
apply. (The nationality of the data subject is not relevant for the scope of the GDPR; the
relevant criterion is whether people are in the EU.)
The GDPR’s imposition of rules on third party trackers is among the clearest articula-
tions of the strategy to limit such relationships. Even companies without a European estab-
lishment are subject to the GDPR if they use personal data for ‘monitoring’ the behavior of
people in the EU.58 For instance, if a behavioral targeting company tracks the browsing
behavior of somebody in the EU. Indeed, the GDPR’s preamble suggests that the rule is
written specifically for online tracking.59
Consequently, if an American company places tracking cookies on the computers of
people in the EU, the GDPR will apply. As we will see, the GDPR also burdens such tracking
by classifying it as ‘high risk.’ The cumulative burdens placed on third parties could be a
blessing for first parties, particularly news organizations and publishers that have grown
dependent on third party tracking. The GDPR treats first-party data uses more leniently,
even recognizing many of such uses as ‘legitimate,’ whereas if these same functions are
performed by third parties, many substantive and procedural requirements are imposed.60
To enhance regulatory oversight, the GDPR requires controllers to establish a ‘represen-
tative’ to serve as a point person in interactions with both data subjects and Data Protec-
tion Authorities (supervisory authorities, roughly comparable with the Federal Trade
Commission in the U.S.).61 Such representative is a natural or legal person that is based
on EU territory.62 The obligation to appoint a representative applies to governmental
organizations and private organizations that either process personal data on a large
scale or that process sensitive personal data, such as regarding medical conditions, politi-
cal beliefs or sexual preferences.
52GDPR art 3(1).
53Case C-131/12 Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD), Mario Costeja González
[2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:317. See also Article 29 Working Party, ‘Update of Opinion 8/2010 on applicable law in light of
the CJEU judgement in Google Spain’ (WP179 update) 16 December 2015.
54GDPR rec 2.
55GDPR art 3(2)(a); See also GDPR recs 22–24.
56GDPR rec 23.
57ibid.
58GDPR art 3(2).
59GDPR rec 24.
60See GDPR art 6(1)(f) and Section 4.2 of this paper.
61GDPR art 4(17), 27(4).
62GDPR art 3(2); See also GDPR rec 80.
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3.4. What are the exceptions from the application of the GDPR?
The unprecedented scope of the GDPR is limited in two respects. First, a plain read of the
GDPR suggests that we are all violating the GDPR, all the time, in our personal lives when
we ‘process’ the ‘personal data’ of our friends by emailing them or by ‘tagging them’ in a
photo online. In principle, these are indeed covered activities.
To keep regulatory focus on companies and organizations instead of ordinary people,
the GDPR exempts data activities for ‘purely personal or household activity.’63 The GDPR’s
preamble shows that ‘correspondence and the holding of addresses, or social networking’
is an example of a situation that falls under the household exception.64 For example, if
somebody sends an email to a friend in which he writes about his nephew, this will nor-
mally not fall under the GDPR. But the exemption is narrow. The Court of Justice of the
European Union held that when the surroundings of a house are filmed by a video
camera attached to the home, for the purpose of identifying burglars, this will not
count as a ‘purely personal or household activity’.65
Second, the GDPR does not regulate national security. National security66 and the pre-
vention and prosecution of criminal offences,67 are largely outside the scope of EU com-
petence.68 National member states hesitate giving up such competences to the EU. The
Police Directive, which entered into force at the same time as the GDPR, sets rules for
data processing by law enforcement agencies, such as the police. The rules in this Directive
allow for more limitations than the general framework provided by the GDPR.69 The GDPR
does apply to data processing by other governmental organizations, although it allows
governments to adopt special regimes in their national laws.70
In addition, the GDPR recognizes that the fundamental right to data protection might
come into conflict with fundamental rights and other public interests, such as governmen-
tal transparency, freedom of speech, and data processing for archiving purposes. In
Europe, freedom of speech is a fundamental right on par with privacy,71 whereas in the
U.S., freedom of speech generally trumps privacy when the two values are in conflict.
The GDPR’s architects were concerned that U.S.-style freedom of speech arguments
could eat the rules. For instance, the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in IMS Health suggested
that data selling – of medical prescription records – in preparation of direct marketing was
63GDPR art 2(2)(c). There are also special rules for national identification numbers (art 87), the context of employment (art
88), obligations of professional secrecy (art 90), and religious associations (art 91).
64GDPR rec 18.
65C-212/13 František Ryneš v. Úřad pro ochranu osobních údajů [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:2428.
66See also: C-473/12, Institut professionnel des agents immobiliers (IPI) v Geoffrey Englebert, Immo 9 SPRL, Grégory Francotte,
intervening parties: Union professionnelle nationale des détectives privés de Belgique (UPNDP), Association professionnelle
des inspecteurs et experts d’assurances ASBL (APIEA), Conseil des ministers [2013] ECLI:EU:C:2013:715.
67See also Article 29 Working Party, ‘Guidelines for Member States on the criteria to ensure compliance with data protection
requirements in the context of the automatic exchange of personal data for tax purposes’, 175/16/EN, WP 234, 16 Decem-
ber 2015.
68GDPR art 23; GDPR rec 73.
69Directive 2016/680/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural
persons with regard to the processing of personal data by competent authorities for the purposes of the prevention,
investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, and on the free move-
ment of such data, and repealing Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA OJ 2016 L 119/89. See also P De Hert and V
Papakonstantinou Vagelis, ‘The New Police and Criminal Justice Data Protection Directive. A First Analysis’ (2015) 7(1)
New Journal of European Criminal Law 7.
70GDPR art 23; GDPR rec 73.
71See S Kulk and FJ Zuiderveen Borgesius, ‘Privacy, Freedom of Expression, and the Right to Be Forgotten in Europe’ in J
Polonetsky, O Tene, and E Selinger (eds) Cambridge Handbook of Consumer Privacy (Cambridge University Press, 2018).
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constitutionally protected.72 Such a fulsome extension of constitutional rights to market-
place activities would obviate many protections.
The GDPR requires member states to balance data protection and freedom of speech
interests, and requires that some of the GDPR’s rules do not apply when personal data
are processed for academic artistic or literary expression.73 The EU left it to the member
states to strike the difficult balance between data protection and freedom of expression,
because different member states have different traditions in this context. For example, the
Netherlands tends to give more weight to freedom of expression than Spain. We can also
expect more case law from the CJEU on the balance between freedom of speech and data
protection.
The GDPR makes clear that the right to privacy and other fundamental rights, such as
freedom of expression, generally have equal weight. But the GDPR does allow for limit-
ations on a small number of its rules, especially the rights of individuals,74 when national
governments deem that limitation necessary in terms of safeguarding other fundamental
rights or public interests.75
4. Lawful data activities under the GDPR
The U.S. has a sectoral privacy regulation system, leaving many data activities subject only
to general consumer protection law. Furthermore, data collection and use are in general
permissible unless a law declares them not to be. The European approach is opposite: vir-
tually all data activities are regulated in some way such that collection and use is always
restricted. On a high level, the GDPR sets forth four rules to make data processing lawful:
controllers and processors must adhere to the FIPs; the controller must have a legitimate
ground for processing personal data; the controller must have grounds for using sensitive
data, which are broadly defined under the GDPR; and the controller must have a lawful
mechanism for moving data outside the EU.
The rights and responsibilities imposed by lawful activities reveal many elements of
GDPR strategy. Viewed negatively, the GDPR appears to be a big data business killer.
Viewed positively, the GDPR imposes a data governance approach, one where companies
thoughtfully design business strategy to use data responsively and parsimoniously.
4.1. Adherence to Europeanized FIPs
The Fair Information Practices (FIPs) – the centerpiece of the 1995 Directive – remain at the
core of the GDPR.76 This is the basis of our claim that those in compliance with the Direc-
tive are well positioned to meet the GDPR’s enhancements. Taken together, the imposition
of the FIPs serves several of the GDPR’s strategic aims. The FIPs attempt to minimize data
72Sorrell v IMS Health Inc. 564 US 552 (2011).
73GDPR art 85. See further Case C-73/07 Tietosuojavaltuutettu v Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy, Satamedia Oy [2008] ECLI:
EU:C:2008:727. See also D Erdos, ‘European Regulatory Interpretation of the Interface between Data Protection and Jour-
nalistic Freedom: An Incomplete and Imperfect Balancing Act?,’ University of Cambridge Faculty of Law Research Paper
No. 61/2015 <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2683471>
74See infra Section 6 on individual rights.
75GDPR arts 85–91.
76See GDPR art 5, which lists the ‘principles relating to processing of personal data’, giving the main data protection
requirements in broad terms. GDPR art 5 is based on the Directive’s art 6. See GDPR rec 9. See generally on the data
protection principles: LA Bygrave, Data Privacy Law: An International Perspective (Oxford University Press, 2014).
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collection and use. In the abstract, the FIPs are an appealing set of substantive and pro-
cedural protections against the power of data intensive companies. But taken together,
the FIPs, create barriers to big data driven business models.77
The GDPR’s data protection principles resemble those developed in the U.S.78 The GDPR
FIPs articulate six high-level principles that data controllers and processors must consider.
The FIPs apply cumulatively – each must be fulfilled in order for the data processing to be
legitimate.
First, the lawfulness, fairness, and transparency principle articulates data protection
law’s overarching norm: personal data must be ‘processed lawfully, fairly and in a transpar-
ent manner in relation to the data subject.’79 The lawfulness requirement is reasonably
clear: personal data processing must be compliant with the GDPR and other laws. The fair-
ness requirement80 could be compared with the general good faith requirement in some
legal systems.81
Second, the purpose limitation principle entails that personal data should only be col-
lected for a purpose that is specified in advance, and that those data should not be used
for incompatible purposes.82 The purpose should be specific and concrete; vague and
abstract purposes such as ‘promoting consumer satisfaction’, ‘product development’ or
‘optimizing services’ are prohibited. A specific purpose exists, for example, when a pizza
delivery service asks for the consumer’s address, to deliver the pizza.
In brief, to assess whether a new purpose is compatible with the original purpose, the
controller should consider, for instance, the link between the original and new purposes,
the context, the data subject’s reasonable expectations, the data’s nature and sensitivity,
the consequences of the intended further processing for data subjects.83 The GDPR does
not consider further processing to be incompatible with the initial purposes, if the further
processing happens for archiving purposes in the public interest, scientific or historical
research purposes, or statistical purposes.84 However, the GDPR requires extra safeguards
for such further processing.85
Purpose limitation strikes at the heart of information-intensive industries, because com-
panies so frequently find utility for data by using and repurposing the data in
77Some even argue that the GDPR represents a rejection of big data driven business models: Tal Zarsky, Incompatible: The
GDPR in the Age of Big Data (2017) 47(2) Seton Hall Law Review 995.
78The FIPs can be recognized, for example, in U.S. Department of Health, Education & Warfare, Records and the Rights of
Citizens (1973) <www.justice.gov/opcl/docs/rec-com-rights.pdf>, in the US Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93–579, 88
Stat. 1896 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2012)). Similar principles are included, for instance, in OECD, ‘Guidelines on the
Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data,’ <http://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/
oecdguidelinesontheprotectionofprivacyandtransborderflowsofpersonaldata.htm>.
79GDPR art 5(1)(a).
80See also GDPR recs 39, 42, 57, 58, 60, 61, 62, 71. The EU Charter also says that personal data processing must happen
‘fairly’, Charter art 8(2).
81See the good faith principle in the Draft Common Frame of Reference: ‘[t]he expression “good faith and fair dealing”
refers to a standard of conduct characterised by honesty, openness and consideration for the interests of the other
party to the transaction or relationship in question.’ Study Group on a European Civil Code, Principles, Definitions and
Model Rules of European Private Law: Draft Common Frame of Reference, C Von Bar, E Clive and H Chulte-Nölke
(eds) <https://www.law.kuleuven.be/personal/mstorme/DCFR.html>.
82The GDPR puts it as follows: personal data shall be ‘collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes and not
further processed in a manner that is incompatible with those purposes.’ GDPR art 5(1)(b). The principle is also included
in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Charter art 8(2). See also Article 29 Working Party, ‘Opinion
03/2013 on purpose limitation’, 00569/13/EN, WP 203, 2 April 2013.
83GDPR art 6(4); GDPR rec 50.
84GDPR art 5(1)(b).
85GDPR art 5(1)(b) and art 89.
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unforeseeable ways. Indeed, the very purpose of machine learning is to discover patterns
not anticipated or even perceivable to people. While many big data enthusiasts have
suggested that the purpose limitation principle is outdated and should be abolished,
the GDPR retains the purpose limitation principle. Hence, on this point the EU made a pol-
itical choice in favor of privacy and data protection.
Third, the data minimization principle holds that personal data should be ‘adequate, rel-
evant and limited to what is necessary in relation to the purposes for which they are pro-
cessed.’86 The preamble adds that ‘[p]ersonal data should be processed only if the purpose
of the processing could not reasonably be fulfilled by other means.’87 Only those data that
are needed for the specific purpose may be obtained. Thus, the pizza delivery service
should not collect data about people’s religious or political views – after all, such data
are not necessary for delivering the pizza. The data minimization principle thus prohibits
collecting as much personal data as possible because the data could be useful in the
future, in a way rejecting many big data business models.
Fourth, the accuracy principle requires that personal data are ‘accurate and, where
necessary, kept up to date.’88 Data controllers must take ‘every reasonable step (…)
to ensure that personal data that are inaccurate, having regard to the purposes for
which they are processed, are erased or rectified without delay.’89 Thus, the accuracy
principle does not always require full accuracy; it requires accuracy ‘having regard to
the purposes’ for which personal data are processed.90 Data controllers must proactively
ensure appropriate accuracy, and must offer data subjects the possibility to correct
data.91
Fifth, in addition to minimizing data, the GDPR tightly limits data storage.92 The prin-
ciple imposes a ‘no longer than necessary’ standard. The preamble adds that controllers
should set, ex ante, time limits for planned erasure.93 Thus, the pizza delivery service
should not store customer addresses for unreasonably long periods. Deleting the
address once the pizza has been delivered would be perfect. But the pizza place could
also keep the address for a few months to save returning customers the time of dictating
their address again.
Sixth, the integrity and confidentiality principle imposes data security responsibilities.
Security must be ‘appropriate’ and protect against loss, destruction, damage and unlawful
processing, thus internal uses of data can be security violations.94 This will be explained in
more detail in Section 5, regarding the responsibilities for data controllers. In sum, the FIPs
form the core of the GDPR – the GDPR is FIPs on steroids.
86GDPR art 5(1)(c).
87GDPR rec 39.
88GDPR art 5(1)(d).
89GDPR art 5(1)(d). See also GDPR rec 71, concerning accuracy in the area of profiling.
90GDPR art 5(1)(d).
91GDPR art 16.
92‘Personal data shall be… kept in a form which permits identification of data subjects for no longer than is necessary for
the purposes for which the personal data are processed; personal data may be stored for longer periods insofar as the
personal data will be processed solely for archiving purposes in the public interest, scientific or historical research pur-
poses or statistical purposes in accordance with Article 89(1) subject to implementation of the appropriate technical and
organisational measures required by this Regulation in order to safeguard the rights and freedoms of the data subject
(“storage limitation”)’, GDPR art 5(1)(e).
93GDPR rec 39.
94GDPR art 5(1)(f).
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4.2. The legal basis for processing personal data
Recall that Europe’s privacy approach enshrines data protection as a fundamental
right.95 To implement this commitment, the GDPR specifies six legal justifications for
data processing, which were copied almost verbatim from the Directive.96 Data proces-
sing should, in addition to adhering to the FIPs, be based on one of six grounds.
Roughly summarized, these grounds are: (1) the data subject has consented to the
data processing, (2) the data processing is necessary for a contract with the data
subject, (3) there is a law mandating the data processing (e.g. tax law requires compa-
nies to keep certain records), (4) data processing is necessary to protect the life of a
data subject (e.g. the data subject is unconscious after a car accident, and the hospital
needs to know from the data subject’s family doctor whether the data subject uses
certain medication) (5) data processing happens for a public task (e.g. the tax office
gathers certain data, such as people’s tax returns, to fulfill its tasks), and (6) when
the interests of the data controller prevail over the interests of the data subject. We
focus on the most important for businesses: (1) consent, (2) contractual necessity,
and (6) legitimate interests.97
Notice and choice dominates the U.S. approach to privacy.98 As companies develop
new uses of data, lawyers change privacy policies and users ‘consent’ to them, on pain
of being denied services.99 The U.S. approach has been called a ‘successful failure’ that por-
trays the market as a privacy-protecting mechanism while blame resides on individuals for
failing to achieve privacy through their ‘choices.’100
In contrast, the GDPR imposes substantive and procedural requirements on consent.
Under the GDPR, consent must be freely given, specific, informed, unambiguous,101 and
revocable.102 Each of these requirements has bite. Valid consent requires an unambiguous
indication of wishes. Hence, companies cannot obtain valid consent by using an opt-out
system in which failure to object is supposed to signify consent. Valid consent requires ‘a
statement’ or ‘a clear affirmative action’ from the data subject.103
The GDPR emphasizes that consent must be genuinely ‘freely given’ to be valid. The
‘freely given’ requirement prohibits, in many circumstances, take-it-or-leave-it conditions
regarding privacy.104 Take-it-or-leave-it choices are ubiquitous: many services only allow
people to use them if they accept being tracked for targeted marketing. And many web-
sites use ‘tracking walls’, barriers that people can only pass if they agree to third party
95Charter art 8(2). See also GDPR rec 40. See also: Case C-131/12 Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v Agencia Española de Protec-
ción de Datos (AEPD), Mario Costeja González [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:317, par 71.
96See Directive art 7.
97See on the six legal bases: Article 29 Working Party, ‘Opinion 06/2014 on the notion of legitimate interests of the data
controller under article 7 of Directive 95/46/EC’ (WP 217) 9 April 2014.
98D Solove, ‘Privacy Self-Management and the Consent Dilemma’ (2013) 126 Harvard Law Review 1880.
99PM Schwartz, ‘Internet Privacy and the State’ (2000) 32 Connecticut Law Review 815.
100Gordon Hull, ‘Successful Failure: What Foucault Can Teach Us about Privacy Self-Management in a World of Facebook
and Big Data’ (2015) 17(2) Ethics and Information Technology 89.
101GDPR arts 4(11), 6(1); GDPR recs 32, 33, 42, and 43. See also Article 29 Working Party, ‘Guidelines on consent under
Regulation 2016/679’ (WP259 rev.01), Brussels, 10 April 2018.
102GDPR art 7(3).
103GDPR art 4(11). See also GDPR art 7.
104GDPR art 7(4). See also Article 29 Working Party 2012, ‘Opinion 04/2012 on Cookie Consent Exemption’, WP 194, 7 June
2012; Article 29 Working Party, ‘Guidelines on consent under Regulation 2016/679’ (WP259 rev.01), Brussels, 10 April
2018.
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tracking.105 Under which circumstances take-it-or-leave-it choices are still acceptable has
to become clear from enforcement. The day the GDPR became enforceable, Max Schrems
complained to Data Protection Authorities about the take-it-or-leave-it practices of
Google, Instagram, WhatsApp, and Facebook.106
The ‘specific’ and ‘informed’ requirements prohibit the use of vague consent requests.
For example, asking consent ‘to use your data for commercial purposes’ cannot lead to
valid consent. Moreover, the GDPR prohibits burying a consent request in the small
print of an End User License Agreement or similar document.107 Revocable means there
needs to be symmetry in enrollment and cancelation – revocation must be as easy as it
was to sign up.108 In sum, because of the GDPR’s strict requirements for valid consent,
consent is, in many cases, simply not practicable as a lawful basis for processing personal
data.
Even if a controller demonstrates these consent elements, the GDPR limits the scope of
consent to approval of processing. That is, consent does not waive other GDPR limitations,
such as minimization, accuracy, or deletion responsibilities.109
Consent is further restraint for children in the context of online services. Children
cannot give consent until they are 16, a major imposition on social network services
such as Facebook that worry about whether younger users will use other systems.
Member States may set a lower minimum consent age, but not lower than 13 years.110
Finally, the GDPR places the burden to demonstrate the lawfulness of consent on the
controller.111
Contractual necessity is a second, obviously necessary, basis for lawful processing. The
GDPR allows processing ‘necessary for the performance of a contract to which the data
subject is party or in order to take steps at the request of the data subject prior to entering
into a contract.’112 The processing must be genuinely necessary to perform the contract
for this basis to apply.113 To illustrate: if somebody orders a pizza, the pizzeria can give
the customer’s address (a piece of personal data) to the delivery person, because the
address is ‘necessary’ to deliver the pizza, and thus to perform the contract.
Taken together, the imposition of costs on gaining consent, and the ruination of its
benefits caused many lawyers to tell clients not to use consent. Instead, lawyers’ strategy
focused on ‘legitimate interests’, which we turn to next.
105See FJ Zuiderveen Borgesius et al., ‘Tracking Walls, Take-it-Or-Leave-it Choices, the GDPR, and the ePrivacy Regulation’
(2017) 3 European Data Protection Law Review 353.
106NOYB, ‘GDPR: noyb.eu filed four complaints over ‘forced consent’ against Google, Instagram, WhatsApp and Facebook’
25 May 2018, <https://noyb.eu/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/pa_forcedconsent_en.pdf>.
107The consent must be ‘clearly distinguishable from the other matters, in an intelligible and easily accessible form, using
clear and plain language.’ GDPR art 7(2).
108GDPR art 7(3).
109Article 29 Working Party, ‘Guidelines on consent under Regulation 2016/679’ (WP259 rev.01), Brussels, 10 April 2018.
110GDPR art 8(1). For children below 16, the parent (or holder of parental responsibility) should authorize consent. The
controller should make ‘reasonable efforts’ to verify that consent is given or authorized by the parent, taking into con-
sideration available technology. GDPR art 8(2). See generally on children and consent to data processing M Macenaite
and E Kosta, ‘Consent for processing children’s personal data in the EU: following in US footsteps?’ (2017) 26(2) Infor-
mation & Communications Technology Law 1. See for an overview of the age of consent in EU member states: I Milkaite
and E Lievens, ‘GDPR: updated state of play of the age of consent across the EU, June 2018’, <https://www.
betterinternetforkids.eu/web/portal/practice/awareness/detail?articleId=3017751>.
111GDPR art 7(1). See for an example of a system to register consent: <https://privacybydesign.foundation/irma-en/>.
112GDPR art 6(1)(b). See also GDPR recs 40 and 44.
113See Article 29 Working Party, ‘Opinion 06/2014 on the notion of legitimate interests of the data controller under article 7
of Directive 95/46/EC’, WP 217, 9 April 2014, 17.
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The legitimate interests provision, also known as the balancing provision, is a catchall
basis that attempts to recognize the multifarious reasons why personal data needs to be
used.114 In order to stop legitimate interests from becoming too broad of a basis, the GDPR
uses a balancing test to compare the relative interests of the controller and data subject. In
the words of the GDPR: processing is lawful if it is
necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third
party, except where such interests are overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and
freedoms of the data subject which require protection of personal data… 115
Many standard business functions fit under legitimate interests. For instance, website pub-
lishers can store IP addresses of website visitors for a brief period, if that is necessary for
security or for fraud prevention.116 And a pizza delivery service may store the customer’s
address, to send the customer a letter if the pizzeria introduces a new menu, or has a
special offer. Storing a customer’s name and address does not, in general, heavily infringe
privacy, and the pizzeria has a legitimate interest in promoting its own business. The piz-
zeria would probably pass the balancing test prescribed by the legitimate interests
provision.
Compared to the Directive, the GDPR sets forth more guidance than the Directive on
the legitimate interests provision,117 and imposes new requirements. For instance, legiti-
mate interests must be explicitly disclosed,118 and there is more emphasis placed on the
rights of children.119
Some lawyers hope that many marketing practices, including online behavioral adver-
tising, can be based on the legitimate interests provision.120 Can you use the legitimate
interests provision that broadly? Well, it depends.121 Certain types of innocuous targeted
marketing, for instance paper direct marketing for the controller’s own products to exist-
ing customers, can be based on the legitimate interests provision. More information-inten-
sive marketing, such as behavioral advertising, generally requires the data subject’s prior
consent.122
Moreover, there are specific rules (outside of the GDPR) for certain types of direct mar-
keting. For instance, robocalls and email marketing are only allowed after the recipient’s
prior consent.123 Prior consent of the recipient is also required for the use of tracking
cookies and similar tracking technologies for behavioral advertising.124
114GDPR art 6(1)(f). See also GDPR recs 47–50.
115GDPR art 6(1)(f).
116See: CJEU, C-582/14 Patrick Breyer v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland [2016], ECLI:EU:C:2016:779. See on the legitimate inter-
ests provision also: CJEU, Valsts policijas Rīgas reģiona pārvaldes Kārtības policijas pārvalde v Rīgas pašvaldības SIA ‘Rīgas
satiksme’, C-13/16, 4 May 2017.
117GDPR recs 37, 47 and 49.
118GDPR art 13(1)(d).
119GDPR art 6(1)(f).
120See, e.g. Hunton & Williams LLP, Centre for Information Policy Leadership GDPR Implementation Project, ‘Recommen-
dations for Implementing Transparency, Consent and Legitimate Interest under the GDPR,’ 19 May 2017.
121See GDPR recs 10, 47, 48, and 49.
122Article 29 Working Party, ‘Opinion 03/2013 on purpose limitation’, WP 203, 2 April 2013, 46. See also FJ Zuiderveen Bor-
gesius, ‘Personal Data Processing for Behavioural Targeting: Which Legal Basis?’, International Data Privacy Law 2015-5-3,
p. 163–176.
123Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the processing of per-
sonal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector, as amended by Directive 2009/136/EC
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2009 <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2002/58/2009-12-
19> (hereafter the ‘ePrivacy Directive’), art 13.
124ePrivacy Directive art 5(3).
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If a controller relies on the legitimate interests provision for targeted marketing, the
GDPR grants people an absolute right to object to (opt out of) that marketing, even for
innocuous direct marketing practices such as direct mail.125 The GDPR has a separate pro-
vision that refers to Do Not Track-like systems: in the online context, ‘the data subject may
exercise his or her right to object by automated means using technical specifications.’126
The Do Not Track standard should enable people to signal with their browser that they do
not want to be tracked on the internet.127
4.3. Sensitive data
Sensitive data processing is another pain point for businesses. The GDPR both broadly
defines sensitive data – termed ‘special categories of personal data’128—and explicitly pro-
hibits their use (subject to exceptions). Special categories of data include personal data
revealing racial or ethnic origin,129 political opinions,130 religious or philosophical
beliefs, or trade-union membership, data concerning health,131 data concerning a
natural person’s sex life or sexual orientation, genetic data and the processing of biometric
data for the purpose of uniquely identifying a natural person. The CJEU has adopted a
wide interpretation of these classes. For example, when somebody mentioned on a
website that a colleague injured her foot and worked part-time on medical grounds,
the CJEU said that the this constituted disclosing personal data concerning health.132
Americans might find this approach unreasonable, but on the Continent, the Nazi, Stasi,
and Soviet uses of special category data are still in the minds of the living.
The problem for businesses is that sensitive data are valuable for ad targeting. Many
marketers, especially in the U.S., frame their consumer segments in terms of racial or pol-
itical identity. And the many exceptions to the ban on processing are impracticable or
simply not suited for most businesses.
Although the GDPR prohibits the processing of sensitive data, there are several excep-
tions. The most felicitous is consent, but in addition to the GDPR’s already high bar for
consent, special categories data requires consent to be ‘explicit.’133 So strong was the
GDPR’s commitment to this rule that Member States may enhance it by eliminating the
consent exception entirely.134
The GDPR allows processing of special categories of data where the ‘data subject has
manifestly made his or her personal data public’.135 This exception applies, for instance,
125GDPR art 21; GDPR rec 47.
126GDPR art 21(5). See also GDPR rec 59.
127See generally on Do Not Track and European law: FJ Zuiderveen Borgesius, J Van Hoboken, K Irion, and M Rozendaal, ‘An
Assessment of the Commission’s Proposal on Privacy and Electronic Communications,’ Directorate-General for Internal
Policies, Policy Department C: Citizen’s Rights and Constitutional Affairs, June 2017 <https://ssrn.com/abstract=
2982290>.
128GDPR art 9. The Data Protection Directive had a similar regime in art 8.
129Regarding data about racial origin, the preamble says that the EU does not accept theories that try to determine the
existence of separate human races (GDPR rec 51).
130See on personal data revealing political opinions: GDPR rec 56.
131See on data relating to health: GDPR recs 35, 45, 52–54, 63, 65, 71, 75, 91. Health data can relate to both a person’s
physical and mental health, including the provision of health care services, which reveal information about his or her
health status. GDPR art 4(15).
132C-101/01 Bodil Lindqvist [2003] ECLI:EU:C:2003:596.
133GDPR art 9(2)(a).
134ibid.
135GDPR art 9(2)(e).
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to data about politicians who publicly tell about their political opinions. The exception can
also apply if somebody openly and explicitly stated that he or she is gay or has a certain
medical condition, addressed at the public at large and intended to be accessible to every-
one. Another exception concerns employment relationships; in that context businesses
may use special category data in some circumstances.136 Another exception covers pro-
cessing necessary for preventive or occupational medicine.137 The other exceptions are
either irrelevant or poorly suited to business needs. The prohibition can be lifted, in
certain circumstances, when the processing of sensitive data is necessary for:
. protecting the vital interests of the data subject or of another person when they are
physically or legally incapable of giving consent.138
. the functioning of a church, trade union, political party, or similar non-profit
organization.139
. for the establishment, exercise, or defense of legal claims, or whenever courts are acting
in their judicial capacity.140
. for reasons of substantial public interest.141
. for a specific, substantial public interest, such as public health.142
. for archiving purposes in the public interest, scientific or historical research purposes or
statistical purposes.143
Like the Directive, the GDPR contains a separate regime for personal data relating to
criminal convictions and offences. In brief, only an official authority may process personal
data relating to criminal convictions and offences or related security measures. A compre-
hensive register of criminal convictions may only be kept under the control of official auth-
ority.144 This stands in stark difference from the U.S. landscape, where arrest records are
open to public inspection and copying. Even where the suspect is never charged or not
convicted, this information remains in the public record and is actively traded by
companies.
4.4. Moving data outside Europe – cross border data transfers
The EU’s strong rules for data could be made futile if information can simply be moved to a
‘data haven’ with fewer or no restrictions. Thus, the GDPR establishes a framework for
136GDPR art 9(2)(b). GDPR rec 52.
137For example, when the processing of health data is necessary for the assessment of the working capacity of the
employee, medical diagnosis, the provision of health or social care or treatment or the management of health or
social care systems and services. GDPR art 9(2)(h).
138GDPR art 9(2)(c).
139GDPR art 9(2)(d).
140GDPR art 9(2)(f).
141The GDPR adds an additional requirement when it comes to legitimizing the processing of special categories of data
(sensitive data). The processing should not only be in the public interest, but in the ‘substantial’ public interest. The
GDPR does not specify what is to be regarded as substantial. GDPR art 9(2)(g).
142Examples include protecting against serious cross-border threats to health or ensuring high standards of quality and
safety of health care and of medicinal products or medical devices. GDPR art 9(2)(i).
143GDPR art 9(2)(j). See also GDPR art 89.
144GDPR art 10.
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international transfers of data.145 The rules are detailed, but can be roughly summarized as
follows. Transfer is allowed in two situations.146
First, the European Commission can evaluate other countries’ legal regimes and find
them adequate.147 The Commission has approved only eleven jurisdictions: Andorra,
Argentina, Canada, Faeroe Islands, Guernsey, Isle of Man, Israel, Jersey, New Zealand, Swit-
zerland, and Uruguay.148 Such approval is normally only given after long negotiations, in
which the country in question updates its national data protection regime to a level that is
nearly as protective as the EU-data protection rules.
Second, when the data are transferred to an organization that is based in a non-EU
country for which there is no adequacy decision, this will only be deemed legitimate
when the organization in question contractually guarantees that it will uphold, within
its organization, a level of data protection that is similar to the GDPR, including all of
the material and procedural safeguards. Consequently, the data transferred to an organ-
ization in a non-EU country will still be under a similar level of protection as when they
would have stayed on EU-territory.149
For the U.S., which does not have the status of a country with ‘adequate’ protection, a
special ‘Safe Harbor’ arrangement was in place. In short, companies from the U.S. from
certain sectors were deemed to offer an adequate level of protection if they agreed to
comply with the data protection principles.150 But a single Austrian lawyer, Max
Schrems, architected a legal challenge to the Safe Harbor that led to its invalidation.
Indeed, at the time of writing, the most powerful companies in America are uncertain
about how they will move personal data from Europe in the future.151
In invalidating the Safe Harbor, the CJEU, concerned about the Snowden disclosures,152
made a broad ruling holding that widespread government access to communications data
and the lack of effective remedies for such access violated the Charter of Fundamental
Rights of the European Union.153 Although ruling in the context of the Safe Harbor, the
reasoning of the Court would suggest that the other mechanisms for transfer are vulner-
able to challenge too.
Following the decision, the European Commission negotiated a new agreement with
the U. S., the EU-U. S. Privacy Shield,154 in which some of the concerns raised by the
145GDPR art 44. See also PM Schwartz and KN Peifer, ‘Transatlantic Data Privacy,’ (2017) 106 Georgetown Law Journal 115.
146For specific circumstances, an exception may apply; these exceptions are as strict and rigorous as those that apply to the
processing of sensitive data. In addition, the exceptions may only be used for incidental, small scale data processing, such
as when the data about one consumer is transferred in a singular instance. GDPR art 49.
147GDPR art 45.
148European Commission, ‘Data Transfers Outside the EU’ <https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-topic/data-protection/data-
transfers-outside-eu_en>.
149GDPR arts 46–47.
150Commission Decision 2000/520/EC of 26 July 2000 pursuant to Directive 95/46 on the adequacy of the protection pro-
vided by the safe harbour privacy principles and related frequently asked questions issued by the US Department of Com-
merce. See also Article 29 Working Party, ‘Opinion 01/2016 on the EU–U.S. Privacy Shield draft adequacy decision’, 16/EN,
WP 238, 13 April 2016. Article 29 Working Party, ‘Statement of the Article 29 Working Party’, 16 October 2015.
151The research for this paper was concluded on 16 January 2018.
152These adequacy decisions do not cover data exchanges in the law enforcement sector. For special arrangements con-
cerning exchanges of data in this field: European Commission, ‘Transfer of Air Passenger Name Record Data and Terrorist
Finance Tracking Programme’ <http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/international-transfers/pnr-tftp/pnr-and-
tftp_en.htm>.
153Case C-362/14 Maximillian Schrems v Data Protection Comr., [2015] ECLI:EU:C:2015:650.
154Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2016/1250 of 12 July 2016 pursuant to Directive 95/46/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council on the adequacy of the protection provided by the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield (notified
under document C(2016) 4176).
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Court of Justice have been addressed. However, other points of concern remain. Still, for
the foreseeable future, the Privacy Shield is the mechanism of choice for most U.S.
businesses. At a high level, the Privacy Shield requires a company to commit to a
GDPR-like level of protection, including all or its principles, prohibitions and material
and procedural requirements. The transfer of personal data from Europe to the U.S. has
been a problem since at least 20 years,155 and will remain a problem, as it is not likely
that the U.S. will adopt privacy rules that could lead to an adequacy status.
5. Responsibilities for data controllers and processors
The GDPR reaffirms the role of the data controller as the party responsible for data, and
imposes stricter controls, duties, and even liability on processors. This came about
because under the Directive, some companies attempted to avoid privacy responsibilities
by declaring themselves to be ‘processors,’ while engaging in controller-like decision
making. In addition, while the Directive granted a large role to the governmental super-
visory organizations, Data Protection Authorities, for monitoring and enforcing the data
protection rules, the GDPR places the primary burden for supervision and control on
the data controllers themselves.
There are 9 obligations the data controller has to abide by, next to the principles dis-
cussed in Sections 3 and 4 of this paper, in order to be GDPR compliant. First, data con-
trollers must keep detailed, accounting-like records of their processing activities.156
Strategically, this obligation not only saddles controllers with ultimate responsibility for
data processing;157 it creates an enforcement roadmap for regulators. The onus lies prin-
cipally on controllers to provide either a judge or a Data Protection Authority with
detailed information to show that they have acted carefully and legitimately. The
record must contain information such as which personal data is processed, why,
whom has access to them, how long they are stored and which security measures
have been adopted.
The record-keeping provisions depart from the strategy in the Directive. The Directive
had a woefully unrealistic requirement that all controllers notify the Data Protection Auth-
ority when planning to engage in any wholly or partly automatic processing operation.158
The Directive envisioned a permit-style approach enabling Data Protection Authorities to
keep a register of data processing activities and to assess the proposed initiatives before-
hand or intervene at an early stage.159 Obviously this was unfeasible and the Directive
allowed states to limit the notification requirement.160 The GDPR eliminated this ex
ante approach.
Second, the data controller must adopt a data protection policy. In it, the data controller
specifies and gives reasons for the various choices made. Why has the controller gathered
personal data; why so many data; for what purpose has it gathered those data; how will it
155See: D Heisenberg, Negotiating Privacy: The European Union, the United States, and Personal Data Protection (Lynne
Rienner Publishers 2005).
156GDPR art 30.
157See also GDPR rec 82.
158Directive arts 18–19.
159Directive art 20.
160Directive art 19.
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ensure that the data are maintained correct and up to date; who has access to the data
within the organization and why do these people need that access; etc.161
Third, the GDPR requires data controllers to be transparent, even when data subjects do
not specifically request information.162 The GDPR requires data controllers to provide
information ‘in a concise, transparent, intelligible and easily accessible form, using clear
and plain language… ’.163 The GDPR specifies a time frame to respond to requests by
data subjects and a duty to explain immediately when a request by a data subject is
denied.164 When controllers develop new purposes for data use, the data subject must
be informed.165 In some situations, it is difficult or impossible for controllers to contact
data subjects. Therefore, the transparency obligations are eliminated in certain situations,
for instance when transparency obligations prove impossible or would involve a dispro-
portionate effort.166
Fourth, the GDPR commands data users to incorporate protections into the technical
design of services with data protection ‘by design’ and ‘by default.’ Data protection by
design broadly means that privacy rules are implemented in the technical infrastructure,
for example pseudonymization and data minimization.167 Data protection by default indi-
cates that privacy-enhancing choices are made the default in the technical infrastructure,
while data subjects can change the default. Data protection by default is intended to
prevent services from selecting settings that expose personal data to many other
people, for instance, when social media profiles are set to public.168
Fifth, the GDPR requires governmental organizations and private organizations that
either process personal data on a large scale or process sensitive personal data to
appoint a Data Protection Officer (DPO).169 The DPO occupies a protected, ombudsman-
like position to oversee controllers and processors.170 Many U.S. companies involved in
internet marketing will have to have DPOs as they are deemed to process personal data
for ‘systematic monitoring of data subjects on a large scale’.171
The DPO will be a foreign and difficult concept for most U.S. businesses. The closest
analogy is to a labor union negotiator. The DPO has to be fully independent,172 and
thus shielded from retaliation when advising the controller or the processor of their obli-
gations. They are tasked with monitoring compliance with the GDPR within the organiz-
ation; advising the organization on how to become fully GDPR-compliant; cooperating
with the Data Protection Authority; and acting as the contact point for both the Data Pro-
tection Authority and the data subjects.173 The DPOs can be seen as the troops on the
ground of the Data Protection Authorities, but appointed and paid for by the data control-
lers themselves.
161GDPR art 24(2).
162GDPR art 12–14.
163GDPR art 12.
164GDPR art 12(2) and 12(4).
165GDPR art 13–14.
166GDPR art 14.
167GDPR art 25(1).
168GDPR art 25(2).
169See GDPR art 37–39.
170See also GDPR rec 97.
171See GDPR art 37(1)(b).
172GDPR art 38.
173GDPR art 39.
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The DPO adds a dynamic that will be difficult for companies to navigate: on one hand, a
company might take on the expense of an internal DPO, one that knows the enterprise
thoroughly, but also one that is not easy to terminate. On the other, a consultant DPO
might not know the enterprise well and have incentives to both interpret the GDPR
harshly and document company non-compliance with advice, because an outside DPO
might be concerned about saving face with the regulator and other clients.
Sixth, the GDPR expands on the Directive with developing ‘Data Protection Impact
Assessments’ (DPIA) for kinds of processing considered high risk.174 Whether there is a
high risk should be assessed by the data controller itself.175 The GDPR assumes high
risk in three cases. First, when a systematic and extensive evaluation of personal aspects
is based on automated processing or profiling and leads to decisions that significantly
affect people. An example might be a bank that processes personal data to decide, auto-
matically, whether people can borrow money. A second example of high-risk processing is
when special categories of data are processed on a large scale. For instance, when a large
hospital processes patients’ genetic and health data.176 Third, when systematically moni-
toring a publicly accessible area on a large scale.177 For example, when a company follows
people’s movements in an airport using Wi-Fi tracking. When a data controller wrongfully
assesses a processing operation not to pose a high risk and thus abstains from doing a
DPIA, this will qualify as a violation of the GDPR in and for itself.178
The DPIA has to describe how and why the data will be processed. But the DPIA must
also make some judgment calls on processing – the necessity and proportionality of the
processing operations, the risks to the rights and freedoms of data subjects, and finally the
measures envisaged to address the risks. If the DPO determines that the processing is high
risk despite compensating safeguards, her or she must inform the data protection auth-
ority. And where the Data Protection Authority thinks that the intended processing
would not comply with the GDPR, it shall give advice on how to mitigate the risks.179
Seventh, the GDPR requires data controllers to ensure that organizational safeguards
are implemented.180 Such may include a clean desk policy, restricting the access of per-
sonnel to databases and logging access to databases by personnel, in order to validate
ex post whether access was indeed necessary and proportionate.
Eighth, the GDPR commands that controllers and processors implement technical safe-
guards keyed to nature, scope, context, and purposes of the processing as well as the risks
of varying likelihood and severity for the rights and freedoms of individuals.181 Such
measures may, for example, include the encryption of data and securing databases with
double or triple authentication measures. The GDPR conception of information security
incorporates confidentiality, integrity, availability, as well as an interest in system resili-
ence. Yet what measures are required is unclear, as the GDPR both signals a ‘state of
174GDPR art 35(1).
175See also Article 29 Working Party, ‘Opinion 04/2013 on the Data Protection Impact Assessment Template for Smart Grid
and Smart Metering Systems (“DPIA Template”) prepared by Expert Group 2 of the Commission’s Smart Grid Task Force’,
00678/13/EN, WP205, 22 April 2013.
176See Article 29 Working Party, ‘Guidelines on Data Protection Impact Assessment (DPIA) and determining whether pro-
cessing is ‘likely to result in a high risk’ for the purposes of Regulation 2016/679’, WP248, 4 April 2017.
177GDPR art 35(1)–35(3); GDPR recs 89–94.
178GDPR art 83(4)(a).
179GDPR art 36.
180GDPR art 32.
181ibid.
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the art’ standard, but tempers the standard with a consideration of the costs involved.182 It
is clear that sensitive data require more security.183
Ninth, there is a personal data breach notification obligation – one much broader than
the U.S. approach focusing on just Social Security Numbers, drivers license numbers, and
financial account identifiers. The GDPR defines a personal data breach as ‘a breach of
security leading to the accidental or unlawful destruction, loss, alteration, unauthorised
disclosure of, or access to, personal data transmitted, stored or otherwise processed’.184
Thus, under the GDPR, many events currently classified by U.S. companies as security ‘inci-
dents’ will now be reportable personal data breaches. For instance, if a company loses its
customer database of emails, contact details, and the like, it need not be reported under
U.S. law but must be under the GDPR.
When a personal data breach occurs, the controller must communicate this to the Data
Protection Authority, on an uncomfortably quick time scale—the GDPR requires breach
notice to the Data Protection Authority in just 72 hours after its discovery. Notice to the
Data Protection Authority is not required if data breach is unlikely to result in a risk to
the rights and freedoms of natural persons.185 If a data breach is likely to result in a
high risk for the rights and freedoms of data subjects, the controller must communicate
the breach to the data subjects too.186 Controllers can avoid notification when encryption
or other techniques reduce the risk to individuals.187 Also, where individual notification is
disproportionally costly, the controller must inform data subjects through a public com-
munication or similar measure.188 Controllers must document all data breaches, even
the ones that they did not have to notify.189
Taken together, these responsibilities require controllers and processors to document
compliance, noncompliance, and failures in the form of data breaches. It’s apparent that
most companies will never be in perfect compliance with the GDPR, and that Data Protec-
tion Authorities will have an easier time investigating and policing deviations.
6. Rights of the data subject
Europeans enjoy unparalleled data subject rights; they can access, rectify, and erase per-
sonal data, and have the right to object to, or restrict, processing.190 These rights existed in
the Directive and have their roots in constitutional instruments, but the GDPR defines
182GDPR art 32. See on the notion of risk GDPR rec 76.
183See on security requirements also: Joined Cases C-293/12 and C-594/12 Digital Rights Ireland Ltd v Minister for Communi-
cations, Marine and Natural Resources and Others and Kärntner Landesregierung and Others [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:238, par
66; A Arnbak and FJ Zuiderveen Borgesius, ‘New data security requirements and the proceduralization of mass surveil-
lance law after the European Data Retention Case’, Amsterdam Law School Research Paper No. 2015-41.
184GDPR art 4(12). See also: Article 29 Working Party, ‘Opinion 03/2014 on Personal Data Breach Notification’, 693/14/EN,
WP 213, 25 March 2014. Article 29 Working Party, ‘Opinion 06/2012 on the draft Commission Decision on the measures
applicable to the notification of personal data breaches under Directive 2002/58/EC on privacy and electronic communi-
cations’, 01119/13/EN, WP197, 12 July 2012.
185GDPR art 33.
186GDPR art 34.
187See also GDPR rec 83 and 85–88.
188See further Article 29 Working Party, ‘Opinion 03/2014 on Personal Data Breach Notification’, 693/14/EN, WP 213, 25
March 2014.
189GDPR art 32(5).
190The rights are not limited to European citizens. See GDPR art 3 on the territorial scope; the nationality of the data subject
does not play a role for the scope of the GDPR.
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them in more detail. In short, the GDPR details seven rights for data subjects: the right to
access; to data portability; to rectify data; to stop processing; to object; to erase data; and
to resist profiling.
The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union grants all people the right of
access to their personal data.191 The GDPR specifies that data subjects have the right to
learn whether controllers are processing their data,192 and if so, to information about
the processing purposes, the categories of personal data, the storage period, the recipients
of the data, where the controller obtained the data. The data also subject has the right to
obtain a copy of his or her personal data.193
Portability is a second right, one included to increase control over data and perhaps
competition for data-intensive services.194 The right to data portability seems to be
inspired by number portability, which grants consumers a right to maintain their tele-
phone numbers when changing providers.195 Under the GDPR’s right to data portability,
data subjects can take their data from one platform, for example Facebook, to another
platform.196 This right to data portability only applies to personal data that data subjects
provided themselves, and the right only applies when either consent or contractual
necessity is the legal basis for processing.197 The data controller must provide such
data to the data subject in a structured, commonly used, and machine-readable
format.198
Third, the GDPR makes specific the right to rectify inaccurate personal data, another
right established in the Charter.199 Americans are familiar with rectification in the form
of credit reporting, where individuals can correct inaccurate information and even add
supplementary statements to make a record more complete.
Fourth, data subjects can restrict processing, they can object to processing, and exer-
cise the right to erasure. Restriction of processing is a new concept in the GDPR. The
GDPR defines ‘restriction of processing’ as ‘the marking of stored personal data with the
aim of limiting their processing in the future.’200 A restriction on processing could be
seen as a processing pause, while details about the fairness and lawfulness of a processing
activity are examined.201 In U.S. law the closest analogy would be a consumer’s right to
have a derogatory and allegedly inaccurate data point removed from a credit report,
while the consumer reporting agency investigates its veracity. Data subjects can
demand restriction of processing because of inaccuracy, because processing is unlawful,
191Charter art 8(2). See also GDPR recs 60–64.
192GDPR art 15(1).
193GDPR art 15(3). For any further copies requested by the data subject, the controller may charge a reasonable fee based
on administrative costs. GDPR art 15(3). The right to obtain a copy must not adversely affect the rights and freedoms of
others. GDPR art 15(4). If the data subject makes the request by electronic means, in principle the controller must provide
the data in a commonly used electronic form. GDPR art 15(3) GDPR. Under certain circumstances, data controllers must
inform data subjects about access, rectification, and erasure rights (GDPR art 13(2)(b) and GDPR art 14(2)(c) GDPR).
194GDPR art 20; rec 68.
195The Universal Services Directive requires phone companies to offer number portability. Directive 2002/22/EC on univer-
sal service and users’ rights relating to electronic communications networks and services [2002] OJ L108/51 art 30(1).
196GDPR art 20.
197GDPR art 20 (1).
198GDPR art 20(1). The preamble adds that the data portability right does not oblige ‘controllers to adopt or maintain pro-
cessing systems which are technically compatible.’ GDPR rec 68.
199GDPR art 16 GDPR; Charter art 8(2).
200GDPR art 4(3). See also GDPR rec 65.
201Where processing has been restricted, the personal data may only be processed with the data subject’s consent, for legal
reasons, or for an important public interest. GDPR art 18(2).
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or when the data subject objects to processing based on legitimate interests of the con-
troller (while the balancing process occurs).202
Fifth, data subjects may also stop processing by objecting in certain circumstances.203
When controllers justify processing with the legitimate interest or public interest ratio-
nales,204 data subjects may object, stopping processing and triggering a balancing
inquiry. After objection, the controller can continue processing if it can demonstrate com-
pelling legitimate grounds for the processing that override the interests of the data
subject, or for exercising legal claims.205 For example, a state body that processes personal
data can override a data subject objection for reasons of public interest.206 As noted pre-
viously, the GDPR has a special regime for direct marketing: people have an absolute right
to object to (opt out of) direct marketing.207
Sixth, the GDPR articulates the ‘right to erasure (“right to be forgotten”)’.208 An erasure
right also appeared in the Directive. The GDPR adds the phrase ‘right to be forgotten’ – an
unfortunate phrase, because people cannot require others to forget them. The right to
erasure is widely derided despite having many antecedents in U.S. law.209 Erasure is a
broader right than in U.S. Law.
Roughly summarized, a data subject has a right to erasure when he or she successfully
exercises the right to object, when the personal data were unlawfully processed, should be
erased because of a legal obligation, or are no longer necessary in relation to the proces-
sing purposes.210 The right to erasure also applies when the data subject withdraws
consent.211 Hence, the right to erasure provides another rationale why consent is a
dangerous basis for processing data.
The preamble says that the erasure right is especially relevant ‘where the data subject
has given his or her consent as a child and is not fully aware of the risks involved by the
processing, and later wants to remove such personal data, especially on the internet.’212
An example could be an old profile on a social networking site that somebody made
when young, including embarrassing pictures. One might want to have the profile
deleted. In many cases, personal data will be spread from the original source all over
the internet. Therefore, the GDPR requires the controller to make a reasonable effort to
erase the personal data elsewhere on the internet, taking account of available technology
and the costs of implementation.213
The right to erasure does not apply when erasure conflicts with the freedom of
expression and the latter interest prevails.214 Striking this balance is notoriously difficult.
202GDPR art 18(1).
203GDPR art 21(1).
204GDPR art 6(1)(2) and 6(1)(f).
205GDPR art 21(1).
206GDPR art 21(1). See also GDPR art 21(6).
207GDPR art 21(2) and 21(3). See Section 4.2 of this paper.
208GDPR art 17.
209Many U.S. laws, ranging from the Privacy Act to the Fair Credit Reporting Act and the Videotape Privacy Protection Act,
place a ceiling on the retention of or use of data. The general principle that businesses should only keep data for so long
as necessary for commercial function is a command to erase too.
210GDPR art 17.
211GDPR art 17 (1).
212GDPR rec 65. See also GDPR rec 66.
213GDPR art 17(2).
214GDPR art 17(3)(a). The GDPR gives an additional list of exceptions to the right to erasure: GDPR art 17(3).
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The Court of Justice of the European Union decided in its Google Spain judgment that data
subjects in Europe have, under certain conditions, the right to have search results for their
name delisted from the search results, even where the search result was sourced from a
newspaper.215
Finally, the GDPR regulates profiling and computerized decision-making processes.216
Profiling is processing of personal data
to evaluate certain personal aspects relating to a natural person, in particular to analyse or
predict aspects concerning that natural person’s performance at work, economic situation,
health, personal preferences, interests, reliability, behaviour, location or movements.217
This definition covers behavioral advertising and credit scoring.218
Under this definition, businesses profile all the time. The GDPR intervenes by subjecting
certain types of, fully automated profiling to substantive and procedural rules. If profiling is
fully automated and can produce legal effects or similarly significantly affect him or her,219
it is prohibited unless an exception applies.
Automated decisions can be taken if it is (a) necessary for a contract between the data
subject and the data controller; (b) if it is authorized by a law which includes suitable safe-
guards for the data subject’s interests; or (c) is based on the data subject’s explicit
consent.220 In situation (a) (contract) and (c) (consent), the data controller must implement
suitable measures to safeguard the data subject’s interests, at least the right to obtain
human intervention on the part of the controller, to express his or her point of view,
and to contest the decision.221
The path to compliance is straightforward. Supposed Jane applies for insurance from
John. John can use software to decide whether Jane is insurable, and under what
terms, because this is necessary for a contract. Jane’s interests can be satisfied if John oper-
ates a phone system, where Jane can call and ask a human to reconsider the automated
decision that shaped the insurance contract.
In real life, much of automated decision-making supplements human judgment,
and these systems appear to escape the prohibition. For instance, in credit scoring,
the evaluation (in theory) assists the sales manager in deciding whether to grant
credit. The GDPR’s provision only applies to a ‘decision based solely on automated
215Case C-131/12 Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD), Mario Costeja González
[2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:317. See also: S Kulk and FJ Zuiderveen Borgesius, ‘Privacy, Freedom of Expression, and the
Right to Be Forgotten in Europe,’ in J Polonetsky, O Tene, and E Selinger (eds) Cambridge Handbook of Consumer
Privacy (Cambridge University Press, 2018).
216GDPR art 22. The provision is based on Article 15 of the Directive, which was inspired by French law. See on that old
provision: LA Bygrave, ‘Minding the Machine: Article 15 of the EC Data Protection Directive and Automated Profiling’
(2001) 17 Computer Law & Security Report 17.
217GDPR art 4(4).
218See GDPR recs 24 and 71.
219GDPR art 22(1). The provision says that a person has ‘the right not to be subject to’ certain decisions. But many scholars
assume that this right implies a prohibition (with exceptions) of such decisions. See, e.g. D Korff, ‘Comments on Selected
Topics in the Draft EU Data Protection Regulation’ (17 September 2012) <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2150145>; P De Hert
and S Gutwirth, ‘Regulating profiling in a democratic constitutional state,’ in M Hildebrandt and S Gutwirth (eds), Profiling
the European Citizen (Springer, 2008); S Wachter, B Mittelstadt and L Floridi, ‘Why a Right to Explanation of Automated
Decision-Making does Not Exist in the General Data Protection Regulation’ (2017) 7(2) International Data Privacy Law 76;
FJ Zuiderveen Borgesius, Improving privacy Protection in the Area of Behavioural Targeting (Kluwer Law International,
2015) 283–93. See also L Edwards and M Veale, ‘Slave to the Algorithm: Why a Right to an Explanation is Probably Not the
Remedy You are Looking for’ (2017) 16 Duke Law & Technology Review 18.
220GDPR art 22(2).
221Exception (c) is new in the GDPR.
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processing.’222 The predecessor of the GDPR’s automated decision provision from the
Directive has not been applied much in practice; it has remained a ‘dead letter.’223 It
seems plausible that the GDPR’s provision will not be applied much in practice either.224
It is prohibited to base fully automated decisions with legal or similar effects on special
categories of data, unless the controller gains explicit consent or processing is necessary
for reasons of substantial public interest.225 However, it is unclear to what extent this pro-
hibition applies when an automated decision is based on non-sensitive personal data
(such as postal code) that function as a proxy for special categories of data (such as race).
The GDPR also subjects automated decision making to new transparency and accuracy
requirements. Under certain circumstances, the data subject has the right to obtain ‘mean-
ingful information about the logic involved, as well as the significance and the envisaged
consequences of such processing for the data subject.’226 New in the GDPR is an explicit
requirement for controllers using profiling to minimize the risk of errors:
the controller should use appropriate mathematical or statistical procedures for the profiling,
implement technical and organisational measures appropriate to ensure, in particular, that
factors which result in inaccuracies in personal data are corrected and the risk of errors is
minimised.227
In conclusion, regarding data subject’s rights, the GDPR follows broadly the same logic as
the Directive. But the GDPR introduces new rights (to restrict processing and to data port-
ability) and gives more details regarding the data subject’s rights.
The aim of the GDPR is primarily to close the gap between the legal principles –most of
which were established in the Directive – and practice. The GDPR achieves this by both
specifying additional obligations for data controllers and by making more explicit data
subjects’ rights. These obligations try to ensure that data controllers implement and
execute the various data protection principles. But the main new feature of the GDPR is
that the GDPR takes enforcement much more seriously than the Directive. Enforcement
is discussed in the next section.
7. Enforcement
The GDPR invests heavily in compliance and enforcement. We discuss three key enforce-
ment issues here: first, who can sue, and the amount of sanction imposed, is dramatically
expanded under the GDPR. The GDPR enables class-action-like activities in Europe, and
fines that approach those established in competition law. Second, the tasks and powers
of Data Protection Authorities have expanded considerably. For businesses, this is a
silver lining – the tasks burden authorities with functions and necessarily will reduce enfor-
cement efforts. On the other hand, the requirement that Data Protection Authorities be
222GDPR art 22(1). The Article 29 Working Party interprets this phrase more generously for the data subject. Article 29
Working Party, ‘Guidelines on Automated individual decision-making and profiling for the purposes of Regulation
2016/679’ (WP251rev.01), 6 February 2018.
223D Korff, ‘Comments on Selected Topics in the Draft EU Data Protection Regulation’ (17 September 2012) <http://ssrn.
com/abstract=2150145>.
224See I Mendoza and LA Bygrave, ‘The Right Not to be Subject to Automated Decisions Based on Profiling’ (2017) <https://
ssrn.com/abstract=2964855>.
225GDPR art 22(4).
226GDPR art 12(2)(f).
227GDPR rec 71.
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independent means a relative immunity from political pressure, similar to what judges and
independent agencies enjoy in the U.S. There are also many Data Protection Authorities;
they can share investigatory information and cooperate in investigations, creating scary
dynamics for companies that are similar to multi-state efforts by the attorneys general
in the U.S. Third, the European Commission and an advisory board have been granted
powers for standard setting. We discuss each point below.
The Directive was plagued by ineffective sanctions. The Directive left fines and other
remedies to individual member states. Some countries implemented the Directive with
maximum fines of a couple of thousand euros – so low to be completely inconsequential
to many businesses. For instance, the CNIL levied its maximum fine against Facebook in
2017 for tracking users for advertising purposes. The fine was 150,000.228
The GDPR brings about a change on three points: sanctions, remedies and liability. The
changes with respect to sanctions are the most spectacular. With regard to the right to
compensation and liability, the GDPR has little new. As for sanctions, there are two
levels of fines, based on seriousness of the violation. Less serious violations can trigger
administrative fines up to ten million euro or, in the case of an undertaking, up to 2%
of the total worldwide annual ‘turnover’ (net – not profit) of the preceding financial
year, whichever is higher. The 2% sanction is triggered when the data controller violates
the rules on, inter alia, consent given by children, data protection by design and by default,
the keeping of documents and records on the data processing activities, notifying a data
breach, and data protection impact assessments.229
More serious violations can trigger administrative fines of up to 20 million euro or, in the
case of an undertaking, up to 4% of the total worldwide annual turnover of the preceding
financial year, whichever is higher. The 4% sanction is triggered, inter alia, in case of a vio-
lation of the data minimization principle, the purpose limitation principle, the accuracy
principle, the integrity and confidentiality principle, the rights of data subjects (such as
the right to be informed and the right to correct or erase data), the transparency obli-
gations, and the rules on trans-border data flows.230
To place this in perspective, Facebook’s 2017 fine of €150,000 could rise to between
€800 mm to €1,6bn under the GDPR. At least in theory. Similarly, in theory, American
businesses are subject to crippling, trillion-dollar liability for aggregated statutory fines
associated with laws such as the Fair Credit Reporting Act. For instance, if Equifax were
to be fined for failing to secure 140 million credit records under the FCRA’s minimum
damage amount, it would face a 12-figure fine. However, no U.S. court imposes such
awards. In fact, the largest FCRA fine appears to have been just $18 million, and it was
reduced on appeal.231 Furthermore, there is no example of a U.S. business failing
because of a privacy fine.
The European reality will be similar. The GDPR dictates that fines be proportional and
keyed to the seriousness of the offense.232 We expect that the first fines under the
GDPR will fall far short of 9 and 10-figure amounts until Data Protection Authorities
228CNIL, ‘Facebook sanctioned for several breaches of the French Data Protection Act,’ May 16, 2017 <https://www.cnil.fr/
en/facebook-sanctioned-several-breaches-french-data-protection-act>.
229GDPR art 83(4).
230GDPR art 83(5) and 83(6).
231Andrew Scurria, ‘Equifax Gets Record-Setting $18M FCRA Verdict Slashed,’ Law360 (January 30, 2014).
232GDPR art 83(1) and 83(2).
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build a set of cases with egregious behavior. This might take decades. In the meantime, the
expanded notion of security breaches will cause more pain than fines. Already, there has
been a dramatic uptick in breach reports to regulators. Because a much broader scope of
security incident needs to be reported to regulators, we think breach notification will be
the primary form of ‘punishment’ that regulated entities experience.
Turning to remedies, here too the GDPR provides new tools that presage more vigorous
enforcement than under the Directive. On the most basic level, individuals can file com-
plaints with Data Protection Authorities. If dissatisfied with the authority’s decision, the
individual can seek judicial remedy.233
In the U.S., individuals have judicial remedies on paper, but the standing doctrine has
undermined the enforceability of many statutory privacy laws. To address this problem,
the GDPR specifies that each data subject has the right to an effective judicial remedy if
they consider that their rights have been infringed as a result of the processing of their
personal data.234 In fact, to overcome the collective action and economic barriers to indi-
vidual suit, the GDPR creates a class-action-like mechanism. Data subjects can have their
complaint brought by a non-profit devoted to protecting rights.235 Austrian lawyer Max
Schrems, the litigant responsible for invalidation of the U.S.-EU Safe Harbor and many
headaches for the U.S. business community, has already created such an entity using
crowdfunding. On the day the GDPR became enforceable, Schrems’ group lodged com-
plaints against Google, Instagram, WhatsApp, and Facebook.236
A second enforcement shift comes in the powers of Data Protection Authorities. Such
authorities have broad powers to investigate, to intervene and even halt data processing,
and to bring legal proceedings. Table 1 summarizes the powers of Data Protection
Authorities.
While Data Protection Authorities have more enforcement powers under the GDPR,
they also have many duties that will consume resources and prevent all but the most
focused authorities from becoming aggressive enforcers. Table 2 summarizes the tasks
of Data Protection Authorities.
Data Protection Authorities have been understaffed, under-resourced, and sometimes
have not enjoyed adequate independence. The CJEU has decided in a few cases that
certain member states did not sufficiently safeguard the independence of its Data Protec-
tion Authority.237 The GDPR strengthens supervisory independence.238
In the U.S. the Federal Trade Commission takes consumer complaints but does not adju-
dicate them. Instead, the FTC sets policy by selecting consequential cases, sometimes
completely untethered from the complaints received. Data Protection Authorities, on
the other hand, are obliged to hear complaints, which will cost them a lot of time.239
As explained in Section 2, the Data Protection Directive from 1995 ordered Member
States to pass implementing privacy legislation. Some states passed weak laws and sig-
naled a business-friendly environment with weak-wristed Data Protection Authorities.
233GDPR art 77 and 78.
234GDPR art 79.
235GDPR art 80.
236See <https://noyb.eu>
237See for instance: Case C-288/12 Commission v Hungary ECLI:EU:C:2014:237 8 April 2014; Case C-614/10, CJEU (Grand
Chamber) European Commission v Republic of Austria, 16 October 2012.
238GDPR arts 51–54. See further GDPR recs 117–124.
239See GDPR art 57(1)(f).
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Many companies chose to locate their European headquarters in countries with a low
regulatory burden or with underequipped Data Protection Authorities.
The GDPR specifies which Data Protection Authority is the main regulator for a
company. A company’s ‘lead supervisory authority’240 is based on the ‘main establishment’
of the controller or processor.241 The ‘main establishment’ is the place of a controller’s or
processor’s central administration, or the place where the decisions on the purposes and
means of the processing (with respect to processors, where the main processing takes
Table 1. Powers of data protection authorities, summarya.
Investigatory powers Corrective powers Authorization and advisory powers
a. Order the controller and the
processor to provide information to
Data Protection Authorities (DPAs)
a. Issue warnings to a controller or
processor that intended processing
operations are likely to infringe the
GDPR
a. Advise the controller (prior
consultation procedure)
b. Carry out investigations in the form
of data protection audits
b. Issue reprimands to a controller or a
processor where processing
operations have infringed the GDPR
b. Issue opinions on data protection
issues, to the national government
or to other institutions and to the
public
c. Carry out a review on certifications
issued
c. Order the controller or processor to
comply with the data subject’s
requests to exercise his or her rights
c. Authorize processing, if Member
State law requires such prior
authorization
d. Notify the controller or the
processor of an alleged
infringement of the GDPR
d. Order the controller or processor to
bring processing operations into
compliance with the GDPR
d. Assess and approve draft codes of
conduct
e. Obtain, from the controller and the
processor, access to all personal
data and necessary information
e. Order the controller to
communicate a personal data
breach to the data subject
e. Accredit certification bodies
f. Obtain access to premises of the
controller and the processor,
including to any data processing
equipment and means
f. Impose a temporary or definitive ban
on processing
f. Issue certifications and approve
criteria of certification
g. Order the rectification, restriction or
erasure of data, and the notification
of such actions to recipients of the
data
g. Adopt standard data protection
clauses
h. Withdraw a certification or order the
certification body to withdraw a
certification issued, or to order the
certification body not to issue
certification
h. Authorize contractual clauses
i. Impose an administrative fine i. Authorize administrative
agreements
j. Order the suspension of data flows to
a recipient in a third country
j. Approve binding corporate rules
aGDPR art 58.
240GDPR recs 125–128.
241GDPR art 56.
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place) of personal data are taken.242 Although there is a lead authority, the GDPR specifies
that authorities can cooperate, have joint operations,243 and share information,244 making
it risky for companies to communicate different messages.
Those familiar with the Directive know that the Article 29 Working Party was a body that
made non-binding but persuasive recommendations on interpretations of the law and
that it postured in favor of more data protection rights.245 The GDPR strengthens the
voice of Data Protection Authorities on a Europe-wide level through the transformation
of the Working Party into the European Data Protection Board (EDPB). The EDPB is com-
posed of the head of one Data Protection Authority of each Member State and of the Euro-
pean Data Protection Supervisor.246
Table 2. Tasks of data protection authorities, summarya.
a. Monitor and enforce the application of the GDPR b. Promote public awareness of the risks, rules, safeguards
and rights in relation to personal data processing,
especially when children are affected
c. Advise the national government and other institutions on
legislative measures relating to processing personal data
d. Promote the awareness of controllers and processors of
their obligations
e. Upon request, provide information to data subjects
concerning the exercise of their rights
f. Deal with complaints by data subjects
g. Cooperate with other Data Protection Authorities h. Conduct investigations on the application of the GDPR
i. Monitor relevant developments, in particular the
development of information and communication
technologies and commercial practices
j. Adopt standard contractual clauses
k. Maintain a list of processing operations that require a
data protection impact assessment
l. Advise in relation to prior consultation regarding high risk
processing
m. Encourage the drawing up of codes of conduct and
assess and possibly approve such codes
n. Encourage the establishment of data protection
certification mechanisms and data protection seals and
marks, and possibly approve the criteria of certification
o. Carry out a periodic review of certifications p. Publish the criteria for accreditation of a body for
monitoring codes of conduct and of a certification body
q. Conduct the accreditation of a body for monitoring
codes of conduct and of a certification body
r. Authorize contractual clauses and provisions
s. Approve binding corporate rules t. Contribute to the activities of the European Data
Protection Board
u. Keep internal records of breaches of the GDPR and of
measures taken, in particular warnings issued and
sanctions imposed
v. Fulfill any other tasks related to the protection of
personal data
aGDPR art 57.
242GDPR art 4(16). See further GDPR rec 36.
243GDPR art 62.
244GDPR art 66.
245Directive art 29.
246GDPR art 68. See on its functioning also: GDPR recs 139–143.
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The tasks of the EDPB include advising national Data Protection Authorities,247 advising
the European Commission;248 and issuing guidelines, recommendations, and best prac-
tices.249 The EDPB’s tasks and powers are summarized in Table 3.
8. Conclusion
This paper introduced the normative foundations, attributes, and strategic approach to
regulating personal data advanced by the European Union’s GDPR. We explained the
Table 3. Tasks of the European data protection board, summarya.
a. Monitor and ensure the correct application of the GDPR b. Advise the European Commission on any personal data
issue
c. Advise the European Commission on the exchange of
information between controllers and Data Protection
Authorities for binding corporate rules
d. Issue guidelines, recommendations, and best practices on
procedures for deleting links, copies or replications of
personal data (right to be forgotten)
e. Examine any question covering the application of the
GDPR and issue guidelines etc. to encourage consistent
application
f. Issue guidelines etc. for specifying the criteria and
conditions for decisions based on profiling
g. Issue guidelines etc. regarding data breaches and their
notification
h. Issue guidelines etc. regarding the circumstances in which
a data breach is likely to result in a high risk
i. Issue guidelines etc. regarding binding corporate rules j. Issue guidelines etc. regarding data transfers to non-EU
countries
k. Draw up guidelines for DPAs regarding the powers of
DPAs and regarding fines
l. Review the practical application of the guidelines etc.
regarding the consistent application of the GDPR and
regarding profiling
m. Issue guidelines etc. for establishing common
procedures for reporting by individuals of GDPR
infringements
n. Encourage the drawing-up of codes of conduct and the
establishment of data protection certification mechanisms
and data protection seals and marks
o. Carry out the accreditation of certification bodies and
maintain a public register of accredited bodies
p. Specify the requirements regarding the accreditation of
certification bodies
q. Advise the European Commission on certification
requirements
r. Advise the European Commission on icons (for
transparency)
s. Advise the Commission on the assessment of the
adequacy of non-EU countries
t. Issue opinions and adopt decisions to ensure the
consistent application of the GDPR in the EU
u. Promote the cooperation between DPAs v. Promote common training programs and facilitate
personnel exchanges between DPAs
w. Promote the exchange of knowledge with DPAs and
similar bodies worldwide
x. Issue opinions on codes of conduct drawn up at EU level
y. Maintain a public register of decisions taken by DPAs
and courts that are relevant for the consistent
application of the GDPR
aGDPR art 70.
247GDPR art 70(1)(a).
248GDPR art 70(1)(b), 70(1)(c), and 70(1)(q) – 70(1)(s).
249GDPR art 70(1)(d) – 70(1)(m).
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genesis of the GDPR; described the GDPR’s approach and provisions; and made predic-
tions about the GDPR’s short and medium-term implications. We showed that the GDPR
is best understood as an extension and refinement of existing requirements imposed
by the 1995 Data Protection Directive. The core of data protection law proves to be
remarkably stable. Data protection’s core principles, comparable to the Fair Information
Principles, are retained in the GDPR.
However, the GDPR also brings significant changes. The GDPR brings personal data into
a complex, detailed, and protective regulatory regime, which will have profound impli-
cations. For example, the GDPR encourages companies to think carefully about their per-
sonal data practices. The GDPR attempts to make companies take privacy seriously. The
GDPR encourages companies to vet service providers for their compliance with the
rules Another innovation is that the GDPR elevates privacy officials within organizations.
Furthermore, the GDPR is skeptical of the legal tool of ‘informed consent’: in some circum-
stances, organizations cannot rely on consent. And the GDPR emphasizes the importance
of accurate data and grants people the right to access and correct data. We foresee that, in
the private sector, first party relationships with individuals become more important, to the
detriment of third party relationships. We also expect an extended tussle between Data
Protection Authorities and large technology companies about the interpretation of the
GDPR.
The main disadvantage of the GDPR is its length and complexity: 99 detailed provisions.
Whether the GDPR will actually improve fairness and respect for fundamental rights can, of
course, only be assessed when it has been applicable for some time.
Meanwhile, the European Commission has started its next privacy project. The Commis-
sion has published a proposal for an ePrivacy Regulation, which should replace the ePriv-
acy Directive. The proposal includes rules to protect confidentiality of communications on
the internet, and rules regarding cookies and online tracking.250
The rules for fair processing of personal data will never be finished. Just like in consumer
protection law or environmental law, the rules will have to be updated and amended con-
tinually, to adapt to new circumstances. In conclusion, the GDPR signals a new phase in
privacy law, and will influence policy worldwide.
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